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Abstract
Intellectual giants provide broad shoulders for subsequent inventors. Their un-
finished inquiry, however, also casts shadow on the prospect of future research. This
paper incorporates this shadow effect into a two-stage innovation process and shows
that patenting the first-stage result (the basic invention)may enhance the second-stage
innovation. It is optimal to reject patent protection to the basic invention only when
this beneficial effect does not arise, and when it is essential to preserve the pioneering
inventor’s incentive to continue research activities.
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1 Introduction
“By standing on the shoulders of Giants,” Sir Isaac Newton and generations of scholars
saw further and more than their predecessors. This cumulative process of knowledge
generation has been recognised as the foundation of modern economic analysis of
innovation (Green and Scotchmer, 1995, Scotchmer, 1996, O’Donoghue, 1998, Deni-
colo`, 2000, Bessen and Maskin, 2009). The unfinished pursuits of intellectual giants,
however, leave a daunting task to follow. When evaluating the possibility to con-
struct a necessary view to interpret probability,1 Savage (1972, p. 61) cited the limited
progress made by its two most prominent enthusiasts, J. M. Kenyes and R. Carnap,
and suggested that:
That these men express any doubt at all about the possibility of narrowing
a personalistic view to the point where it becomes a necessary one, after
such extensive and careful labor directed toward proving this possibility,
speaks loudly for their integrity; at the same time it indicates that the task
they have set themselves, if possible at all, is not a light one.
In another discipline, Farber (2010, p. 7) also expressed the same sort of doubts:
The search for a foundational First Amendment “brick” has been unavail-
ing so far. If so many thoughtful legal commentators have failed to identify
the foundational value that supports a unified First Amendment theory, the
prospects for future efforts may be dim.
In other words, when intellectual giants tumble or remain silent, their legacy may cast
a shadow on future explorations.
This paper addresses the impacts of this “shadow effect” on innovation and patent
policy. Section 2 introduces a simple innovation game where a pioneering inventor
(she) and a follower (he) sequentially conduct research on an invention that may be
impossible to achieve. The follower observes the pioneer’s result and adjusts his own
assessment of the successful probability accordingly. Since the two players pursue the
same invention, the pioneer’s failure sends a bad news to the follower. And a more
devoted pioneer casts a darker shadow on the follower. In a simple way, this captures
the negative information spill-over between inventors of different generations.
1According to Savage (1972), “Necessary views hold that probability measures the extent to which one set of
propositions, out of logical necessity and apart from human opinion, confirms the truth of another. They are generally
regarded by their holders as extensions of logic, which tells when one set of propositions necessitates the truth of
another.”
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In section 3, I incorporate this shadow effect into a two-stage innovation process
to discuss patent policy issues. Following the literature a` la Green and Scotchmer
(1995), I assume that the completion of the first stage is a pre-requisite to start the
second stage. For the purpose of policy discussion, I refer to the first-stage invention
as the abstract idea or basic invention, and the second-stage invention as the appli-
cation. Only the pioneer participates in the first stage. At the second stage, the pio-
neer and follower sequentially engage in innovation activity as described in section
2. Hence the source of shadow effect is the pioneer’s innovation effort at the second
stage. Assume that the application is always patentable, and will always infringe on
the abstract idea should the latter become patentable. I consider how patent rights
of the abstract idea, or the basic patent, affect the overall innovation performance, the
structure of the innovation market, and whether it is optimal to grant the basic patent.
A basic patent transfers the follower’s innovation surplus to the pioneer. Consis-
tent with the literature, this sharing effect encourages the pioneer to engage in basic
research, but reduces both the pioneer’s and follower’s efforts at the second stage.
Shadow effect, however, offsets this direct effect on the follower. The pioneer’s lower
second-stage effort restores the follower’s confidence about the likelihood of success.
When shadow effect outweighs sharing effect, the follower is more willing to conduct
research after the abstract idea becomes patentable. The basic patent may improve the
performance of both stages of innovation, and encourage decentralization of the in-
novation market, measured by the extent to which different inventions are created by
different inventors. Shadow effect thus pictures a less gloomy role of the basic patent
than previous literature predicted.
I then consider the optimality of the basic patent, a topic that is related to the
debate of patentable subject matter in patent law. In light of the cumulative feature
of innovation, the economic literature emphasises the importance of proper reward to
early stage inventions, and focuses on how to adjust patent rights to latter inventions
in order to balance R&D incentives across different stages in the innovation process.2
Patent law, however, does not always enthusiastically embrace the strong protection
to basic inventions. The Supreme Court of the United States has long held that “[h]e
who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it
which the law recognises. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come from
2See Scotchmer (2004) for a literature review. Bessen and Maskin (2009) argues that the patent system
should be abolished in the cumulative innovation environment.
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the application of the law of nature to a new and useful end.”3 Established in case law, the
doctrine of patentable subject matter (henceforth, the DPSM) precludes the following
from the realm of patent protection:4
principles, laws of nature, mental processes, intellectual concepts, ideas,
natural phenomena, mathematical formulae, methods of calculation, fun-
damental truths, original causes, motives, [and] the Pythagorean theorem. . . .
Applications of abstract ideas and principles, instead, can be patented, provided that
they fulfill other patent law requirements.
To reconcile this discrepancy between economic theory and patent law (Eisenberg,
2000), I use the two-stage model to analyze when it is optimal to enable the DPSM
and deny patent protection to the abstract idea in order to “promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts.”5 That is, to maximise the probability of finishing the
two stages and inventing the application.6 Previous analysis immediately provides
a necessary condition: The DPSM is optimal only when the basic patent hampers
subsequent innovation. The DPSM, therefore, cannot be the optimal policy when
shadow effect dominates sharing effect.
Suppose that this necessary condition holds. The DPSM is more likely to be op-
timal when, at the second stage, the pioneer has better innovation capacity, while the
follower is less likely to make the discovery. In this model, the patent policy has to
balance not only incentives of different generations of inventors, but also those of the
same inventor at different innovation stages. When the follower has a rather small
probability to find the application (even without the threat of basic patent), there is
little surplus to be transferred from the follower to the pioneer. The basic patent has
3Funk Bros. Seed Co. vs. Kalo Inoculand Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
4In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 352 (C.C.P.A. 1979). See also Merges (1997). The European
Patent Convention excludes the following from patentable inventions: (a) discoveries, scientific theories
and mathematical methods; (b) aesthetic creations; (c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental
acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for computers; and (d) presentations of information
(http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/1973/e/ar52.html).
5U.S. Constitution, Art I, sect. 8, cl. 8.
6For sure, one may find other justifications for the DPSM, such as the difficulty to enforce patent rights
based on abstract ideas or mental process, or the somewhat ambiguous difference between “discovery” and
“invention.” In Gottschalk vs. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), the Supreme Court states that: “It is conceded that
one may not patent an idea.. . . The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical application except
in connection with a digital computer, which means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly
preempt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.” This argument
could be analyzed as one with patent scope, i.e., whether to allow a patent with a very broad scope such
that it covers all inventions using the algorithm.
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limited incentive benefit on the first-stage innovation. On the other hand, the small
research capacity of the follower also implies that the second-stage discovery largely
depends on the pioneer’s performance. When the pioneer can find the application
with a significant probability, provided that she is willing to do so, the negative effect
of the basic patent as an “intermediate reward” can be non-negligible. The DPSM
then is justified as a way to preserve the pioneer’s continuing efforts in research.
This finding implies that abstract ideas or basic inventions should not be patentable
if engaging in fundamental research entails great first-mover advantage at subsequent
research, while a new comer, lacking the experience at the earlier stage, faces a sub-
stantial obstacle to join the rank. But as the innovation process becomes more “demo-
cratic,” i.e., as knowledge and research capacity disseminate and are no longer con-
centrated on a few “early stars,” then it would be optimal to start patenting abstract
ideas or early inventions. Alternatively, capacities possessed by the pioneer and fol-
lower may be different in kind. The pioneer may be good at perfecting the basic
invention or better understanding its fundamental properties, and follower may be
specialised in identifying uses of the basic invention and adapting it to specific con-
texts. The relative importance of these two capacities then depends on the phase of
technological progress. To the extent that further understanding the basic scientific
principles has priority in primitive technology fields, patent protection should only
cover basic inventions or abstract ideas in mature fields.
My results also provide another interpretation of the shrinking application of the
DPSM since the 1980s. Through a series of court decisions, particularly in computer
software and biotechnology, the scope of patentable subject matters has drastically
increased in the U.S. (Kuhn, 2007). Some commentators have warned that rapid ex-
pansions of patent protection would do more harm than good to the long-term devel-
opment in these fields. And it is an often raised hypothesis that these industries could
have done better had these basic patents been denied. Shadow effect nevertheless
provides a theoretical argument to mitigate this concern.7 Furthermore, if the optimal
patent policy takes into account the concerns listed here, then there may be a reverse
causality: abstract ideas should become patentable precisely when there is a better
follower joining the development process.
Before concluding the paper in section 6, section 4 and 5 discuss some robustness
issues as well as extensions. In section 4, I consider reputation concerns as alternative
7See, e.g., Merges (2007) for a discussion of these “unfulfilling” critics in the software industry.
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incentives to conduct basic research, and licensing of basic patent, and argue that they
do not change themain insight of the paper. In section 5, I let inventor pursue different
applications whose ex ante existence probabilities are correlated. The pioneer’s result,
then, can be either “sunshine” or shadow to the follower. Giving the pioneer the
patent rights provides her an incentive to “choose sunshine over shadow,” namely,
making an innovation decision that would lead to a optimistic rather than pessimistic
follower. This generalised information spill-over again offers a beneficial effect of
basic patent on subsequent research.8
The main contribution of this paper is to bring together shadow effect and patent
policy. Previous works, e.g., Choi (1991) and Malueg and Tsutsui (1997), have in-
troduced shadow effect into the paradigm of Poisson races in the form of uncertain
hazard rates, but do not include patent policy in the analysis.9 Choi (1991) puts haz-
ard rate uncertainty at the first stage of a two-stage race, and illustrates how a rival’s
success boosts an inventor’s confidence. This “If you can do that, why not me?” effect
is the opposite of shadow effect, and I consider a similar “sunshine effect” in section
5. Malueg and Tsutsui (1997) characterises inventors’ time paths of R&D investment
in a one-stage race with hazard rate uncertainty. I put shadow effect at the second
stage to study the role of the basic patent.10
The literature of patent policy, to the best of my knowledge, has not considered
shadow effect. In addition, most studies either assume that early inventions always
receive patent protection (Green and Scotchmer, 1995, Scotchmer, 1996, Denicolo`,
2000), or give equal treatments to innovations at different stages (O’Donoghue, 1998).
Matutes et al. (1996) and Kultti and Mittunen (2008) allow various levels of protection
to the basic invention, including no protection, but conclude that some protection
is always better. Harhoff et al. (2001) and Aoki and Nagaoka (2007) are the two ex-
8This result is obtained under payoff independence. Appendix B introduces payoff externality into this
multiple-application setting.
9Shadow effect also appears in other topics in industrial organization. Mason and Va¨lima¨ki (2011) an-
alyzes a seller’s pricing strategy under demand uncertainty, where the seller’s pessimism grows as time
passes without any sale. Bulow and Klemperer (2002) considers a common-value auction, where the win-
ner’s curse has the same flavor as shadow effect here. As they nicely put it: a larger audience in a seminar
can yield fewer questions because of the concern that “if my question is so good, why hasn’t someone else
asked it?”
10Since the focus of this paper is not the timing of innovation, I choose not to use the framework of
Poisson race in order to illustrate the impact of patent policy in the simplest possible way. Nevertheless, in
Appendix C, I sketch a two-stage Poisson race where both players can participate in both stages, and argue
that the timing of the main analysis could be seen as a reduced-form from this model.
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ceptions that obtain no protection as the optimal policy.11 Keeping firms’ research
intensity constant, Harhoff et al. (2001) cautions that patenting basic inventions (gene
in their model) may induce socially wasteful stockpile of basic inventions and delay
applications. Aoki and Nagaoka (2007) allow firms to vary R&D efforts and is the
most relevant paper on the issue of patentability.
Aoki and Nagaoka (2007) adopts the two-stage Poisson race framework of Deni-
colo` (2000), where inventors have the same innovation technology and free entry char-
acterises the equilibrium outcome. They show that granting the basic patent always
reduces the second-stage innovation efforts, and it is desirable to do so when the cost
at either stage is sufficiently high. The result that costly basic research justifies the
basic patent is intuitive. On the other hand, high cost of application development
renders basic research barely profitable under competition, and calls for patent pro-
tection to the basic invention in order to encourage entry in the first stage.12 By con-
trast, I illustrate the beneficial effect of basic patent on subsequent innovation, due to
shadow effect, and stress the asymmetry between inventors of different generations. I
will also show that, when the first-stage innovation cost has uniform distribution, the
optimality of the DPSM does not depend on the cost parameter (the support of the
distribution) at this stage. In this regard, my analysis is complementary to the insight
derived in Aoki and Nagaoka (2007).
Finally, the literature of multistage tournaments also emphasises a proper design
to balance participants’ efforts at different stages. Goltsman and Mukherjee (2008)
considers the optimal rule to disclose intermediate result, and Gershkov and Perry
(2009) considerswhether to conduct amidterm review in the first place, as well as how
to allocate the final prize according to the results at different stages. Both works share
the same concern of this paper, namely, a policy that enhances the first-stage incentive
11A long and well established literature in the legal profession has devoted to the doctrine of patentable
subject matter. Merges (1997) presents a textbook treatment. A partial list of recent articles includes Gruner
(2007), Kuhn (2007), and Risch (2008).
12Aoki and Nagaoka (2007) addresses the issue as the utility requirement, which may be one of the legal
bases of the DPSM. That is, an abstract idea is not patentable because it lacks “specific and substantial util-
ity,” i.e., it is not “useful for any particular practical purpose.” (See USPTO, Utility Examination Guidelines,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/utility.pdf.) In Brenner vs. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966), the Supreme
Court ruled that the Manson patent is at a too preliminary stage to be protected by a patent, and stated that
“a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion.”
The Court’s reasoning, however, contains some flavor of patent scope: “Unless and until a process is refined
and developed to this point–where specific benefit exists in current available form–there is insufficient justification for
permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad field.” Risch (2008) suggests to abolish the DPSM
but reinvigorate the utility requirement to assess the patentability of each invention. In practice, the utility
requirement is not strictly applied. Few patent applications are rejected for lack of utility.
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(here, the basic patent as an intermediate reward) also dampens continuation efforts.
My model, however, is not a tournament, because there may be no final prize (the
second-stage invention). This feature is crucial to generate shadow effect, which, to
my knowledge, is also lacking in the literature of tournaments.
2 Shadow Effect: An Illustration
In a nutshell, sequential research efforts and uncertain innovation prospect generate
shadow effect. The latter element introduces learning into the innovation process,
and the former creates a channel to learn. This section builds a simple model to cap-
ture shadow effect. Subsequent sections enrich the basic framework. Throughout the
analysis, I use technology progress as the policy objective, namely, the expected level
of new invention(s) achieved.13
Two inventors, a pioneer (she) and a follower (he), try to discover an invention.
Both players are risk-neutral expected-payoff maximisers and protected by limited
liability. For a reason that shall be clear later, let’s call this invention an application.
Innovation is modeled as a simple search process: After incurring a search cost, an
inventor will find the application, as long as it exists. Players share a common ex
ante belief that the application exists with probability α ∈ (0, 1], and the value of the
application is pi > 0. Denote the ex ante expected value as v ≡ αpi.
Before making the search decision, the pioneer learns her search cost cP, which is
distributed over R+ according to (twice differentiable) CDF GP(·). Similarly, let cF
be the follower’s search cost, and GF(·) the (twice-differentiable) CDF. Both cP and
cF are the inventor’s private information, and distributed independently. The cost
distribution captures an inventor’s innovation capacity. A more capable inventor has
a higher likelihood to get a lower search cost, and so, other things being equal, is more
likely to search and make the discovery. I consider only cases where, from the ex ante
point of view, there is some probability that an inventor will not incur the search cost
even when she/he can grab the whole surplus v.
Innovation uncertainty ensues when α < 1, and sequential innovation is intro-
duced by the assumption that the pioneer searches before the follower (hence the two
labels). I also assume that an inventor cannot commit to the search decision, nor ob-
13The U.S. Constitution instructs the Congress to design exclusive rights of limited terms to “promote the
Progress of Sciences and useful Arts (Artical I, sect. 8, cl. 8). When there is under investment in innovation
activities, this policy goal also coincides with social welfare concerns.
7
serve that of the other party. The follower only observes whether the pioneer has
found the application or not, but not whether she has incurred the cost to search.
The game ends when the pioneer discovers the application. When the follower
observes no discovery and believes that the pioneer searched with probability sP, he
updates the existence probability according to the Bayes’ rule,
α(1− sP)
1− α + α(1− sP) = α ·
1− sP
1− αsP ≡ α · δ. (1)
In the denominator, 1− α is the probability that the application does not exist, and
α(1 − sP) the probability that the application exists but the pioneer did not search.
Only the latter event appears in the numerator. The “belief discount” δ ≤ 1 measures
how the pioneer’s search activity sP affects the follower’s updated belief. Shadow
effect occurs when uncertainty (α < 1) meets an active pioneers (sP > 0), so that the
follower’s updated belief is discounted by a factor δ < 1 and strictly smaller than the
ex ante level. Fixing α ∈ (0, 1), a more intensive search by the pioneer (a higher sP)
casts a darker shadow on the follower: ∂δ/∂sP = −(1− α)/(1− αsP)2 < 0.
Let’s first derive inventors’ optimal search strategy under the scenario of “winner-
take-all,” where the whole value pi goes to the discoverer. In this case, the pioneer
searches when the cost is lower than the ex ante expected value v, which occurs with
probability s∗P ≡ GP(v). The follower applies the discount factor δ∗ ≡ δ(s∗P), and
searches when the cost cF ≤ α · δ∗ · pi = δ∗ · v, which occurs with probability s∗F ≡
GF(δ
∗ · v). The total probability that some inventor will search is S∗ ≡ s∗P + (1− s∗P)s∗F,
and the probability of discovering the application is α · S∗.
How to induce a higher S∗ in a winner-take-all regime? When the winner’s prize
is a patent over the discovered invention, the policy maker may adjust the scope or
length of patent protection to change the size of reward pi (Scotchmer, 2004). Con-
ventional wisdom holds that an increase in pi (via, e.g., the expansion of patent scope
or extension of patent terms) gives a direct boost to inventors’ search incentives and
should raise the overall S∗. Shadow effect, however, provides a countervailing force.
A marginal change of pi affects S∗ by
dS∗
dpi
= (1− s∗F)
∂s∗P
∂pi
+ (1− s∗P)
∂s∗F
∂pi︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect
+ (1− s∗P)
∂s∗F
∂δ
∂δ∗
∂sP
∂s∗P
∂pi︸ ︷︷ ︸
shadow effect
.
(2)
The direct effect, consisting of the first two terms, is strictly positive. The third term
captures shadow effect and is non-positive. It shows how a change of s∗P, induced by
a change in pi, affects s∗F via the belief discount δ
∗.
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Let α < 1 and consider the special case of uniform distribution: ci ∼ UNIF[0, 1/Ki],
i ∈ {P, F}. Let KP < 1 and KFδ∗ < 1/v so that no inventor will search for sure. A
higher Ki implies a better innovation capacity, for the inventor is more likely to have
a lower search cost. After some calculation, the sign of dS∗/dpi is the same as
(1− s∗F)KP + (1− s∗P)KF
δ∗ − s∗P
1− αs∗P
. (3)
For sufficiently high KP such that δ
∗
< s∗P, the whole term becomes negative when KF,
and so s∗F, is large enough. When this is true, the overall innovation efforts S
∗ can be
raised by decreasing pi, e.g., by reducing patent protection to the application.14
The dominance of shadow effect requires both a significant belief discount δ∗ and
an important contribution of s∗F to the overall effort S
∗. Intuitively, a better capacity
of the pioneer (larger KP) provides the necessary deep discount. Since the follower
searches only when there is no discovery from the pioneer, the contribution of an
increase in s∗F is weighted by 1 − s∗P, the probably that the pioneer will not search.
(Similarly, an increase in s∗P deprives the follower of the search opportunity, and so its
“net contributes” to S∗ is weighted by 1− s∗F.) High KF thus reduces the importance
of pioneer’s search, and amplifies the impact s∗F on S
∗.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the discoverer of the application receives the whole value pi. A
lower pi may raise the overall search effort S∗.
This simple exercise shows how shadow effect renders a seemingly straightfor-
ward policy evaluation nontrivial. It poses a trade-off between the two inventors’
search incentives: when α < 1, raising sP causes a more pessimistic follower and thus
discourages sF. The next step is to apply this insight to the issue of patenting the basic
invention.
3 Shadow Effect and the DPSM
I now extend the model to a two-stage innovation setting where the first stage aims to
discover a basic invention, and the second stage to develop an application of the basic
invention. The setting in the previous section is replicated at the second stage, and
sP and sF now refer to the pioneer’s and follower’s second-stage search probability,
respectively, with S ≡ sP + (1− sP)sF as the overall search probability.
14It also reduces the typical deadweight loss associated with monopoly rights.
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Figure 1: Two-stage innovation
I fix the size of pi (and the thus the level of patent protection to the application),
and assume that, for simplicity, the basic invention has no stand alone value. The
basic invention, as a prerequisite to create the application, may be an abstract idea
or scientific principle that requires further development efforts to generate any (eco-
nomic) benefits. As in Matutes et al. (1996), I assume that only the pioneer can engage
in the first stage. Innovation at this stage is also modeled as a search decision, but,
without loss of generality, suppose that the basic invention exists for sure. The pio-
neer can discover the basic invention by incurring a search cost c1, with is distributed
according to CDF G1. Figure 1 summarises the time sequence.15 At time 1.5 of the sec-
ond stage, I assume that, if the pioneer doesn’t come up with the application (either
because she doesn’t search or because her search fails), the pioneer will disclose the
basic invention so that the follower acquires necessary knowledge to search for the
application. She will not, however, disclose whether she has incurred the cost, and
so the follower’s information structure remains the same as in the previous section. I
postpone the discussion of disclosure as well as potential licensing issues to section 4.
Let θ ∈ [0, θ] be the probability that the application will infringe on the basic in-
vention, with θ < 1.16 Post infringement, the infringed party (i.e., the pioneer, the
only inventor to engage in basic invention) receives the whole value pi. The patent
policy θ determines the division of surplus when the follower finds the application.
The DPSM corresponds to the case of θ = 0, namely when the basic invention is not
patentable so that the discoverer can keep the whole pi.
The policy objective, the overall probability to successfully develop the applica-
15See Appendix C for a justification of this timing in a standard two-stage Poisson race setting.
16I provide a justification for the upper bound later; see the discussion before Lemma 1. Alternatively, θ
could be interpreted as the share of surplus that goes to the holder of basic patent. The upper bound θ < 1
then excludes the extreme case where the pioneering inventor has the full bargaining power.
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tion, is now the probability that the pioneer searches at the first stage times the prob-
ability that the application is discovered at the second stage (α · S).17 Absent any im-
mediate return, the pioneer’s first-stage search is motivated by her expected payoff at
the second stage, denoted by uP. At time 0, the pioneer discovers the basic invention
when c1 ≤ uP, which occurs with probability G1(uP).
At the second stage, a policy θ changes the follower’s innovation return to (1−
θ)pi. The follower searches when cF ≤ αδ(1− θ)pi = (1− θ)δv, which occurs with
probability sF = GF((1− θ)δv). The pioneer, on the other hand, can either incur the
cost and receive an expected search payoff v− cP, or wait to share the follower’s fruit,
with an expected payoff sFθv, namely, the probability sF that the follower will search
times the share θv via patent rights. Comparing the two options, the pioneer searches
when cP ≤ (1− sFθ)v, which occurs with probability sP = GP((1− sFθ)v).
Since players cannot observe the opponent’s search strategy, a rational expectation
equilibrium is sought at the second stage. In an equilibrium (sˆP, sˆF), the two inven-
tors’ search strategy is consistent with each other:
sˆP = GP((1− sˆFθ)v) and sˆF = GF((1− θ)δˆv), with δˆ ≡ δ(sˆP), (4)
that is, the follower’s belief is computed according to the pioneer’s equilibrium search
probability. The notation (sˆP, sˆF) is reserved for an equilibrium under θ > 0. The
pioneer’s expected payoff at the second stage is
uˆP =
∫ G−1P (sˆP)
0
(v− cP)dGP + (1− sˆP)sˆFθv, (5)
and the follower’s expected payoff is
uˆF =
∫ G−1F (sˆF)
0
[
(1− θ)δˆv− c] dGF. (6)
I exclude the values of θ such that dsˆP/dθ < 0. By the following lemma, these θs
correspond to a situation where both parties would want to negotiate to a lower θ.
(See section 4 for more discussion about licensing.) Note that at θ = 1, sˆF = 0 and so
dsˆP/dθ > 0, which in turn justifies the upper bound θ being strictly smaller than one.
Lemma 1. If θ > 0 such that dsˆP/dθ ≥ 0, then duˆP/dθ ≤ 0 and duˆF/dθ < 0.
17I do not consider inducing duplicative discovery, i.e., encouraging the follower to search after the pi-
oneer has found the application. It might be desirable for antitrust concerns to create competition, but is
certainly at odd with the objective of protecting the basic invention.
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When the basic invention is not patentable (θ = 0), the second stage admits a
unique equilibrium (s∗P, s
∗
F), as computed in section 2. Unique equilibrium is also
obtained in the absence of shadow effect. When α = 1 and so δ = 1, the follower’s
search probability is not affected by sˆP. The patent policy θ pins down sˆF, which then
determines the pioneer’s search probability sˆP. Here higher θ always reduces sˆF, and
thus the overall probability Sˆ.
When θ > 0 and α < 1, sP and sF become strategic substitutes. Shadow effect
introduces the same negative impact of sP on sF as in section 2. And higher sF re-
duces sP, for the pioneer can extract more surplus through patent rights. This mutual
dependence may lead to multiple equilibria; section 4 present an example.
Despite the possibility of multiple equilibria, the basic patent always reduces the
pioneer’s incentive to continue to do research, s∗P > sˆP for all θ ∈ (0, θ]. The assump-
tion θ < 1 ensures that sˆF > 0 in any search equilibrium, and so s
∗
P = GP(v) > sˆP =
GP((1 − sˆFθ)v) for all θ ∈ (0, θ]. For the follower, a lower search probability from
the pioneer boosts his belief: δˆ > δ∗, for sˆP < s∗P. Shadow effect alleviates the neg-
ative effect of θ on the follower’s search incentives. Whether sˆF ≷ s
∗
F, then, depends
on δˆ(1 − θ) ≷ δ∗. Shadow effect, again, may upset the conventional wisdom that
the basic patent hinders subsequent research. It may happen that, for some θ > 0,
Sˆ = sˆP + (1− sˆP)sˆF > S∗.18
Consider again the example of uniform distributions, ci ∼ UNIF[0, 1/Ki], i ∈
{P, F}. Let both KP and KF be strictly smaller than 1/v, so that inventor will search
for sure. In the proof of Proposition 3, I show that these cost distributions lead to a
unique equilibrium at the second stage. Evaluate the policy impact at θ = 0:
dSˆ
dθ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
= (1− s∗F)
dsˆP
dθ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
+ (1− s∗P)
dsˆF
dθ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
= −v
{
(1− s∗F)s∗FG′P + (1− s∗P)δ∗G′F + (1− s∗P)s∗FG′PG′Fv
∂δˆ
∂sP
∣∣∣∣
s∗P
}
= −vδ∗G′F
[
1− s∗Ps∗F
(
1+
1− α
1− αs∗P
)]
,
(7)
18This result, for sure, requires a sufficiently strong shadow effect. Using human genome sequencing
as the basic invention, Williams (2010) finds that (copyrights-based) intellectual property protection dis-
couraged subsequent research. In her study, however, quick disclosure applies to the reference group, the
genome sequenced by a public initiative (HumanGenome Project). The so-called “Bermuda rules” required
gene sequence information processed under the public project be submitted to the public online database
GenBank within 24 hours of sequencing. Such a short time might prevent participants of the public project
to develop a first-mover advantage in subsequent research. This empirical finding therefore could be inter-
preted as results with insignificant shadow effect.
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which is positive when s∗P and s
∗
F are sufficiently large, and α sufficiently small. The
requirements on s∗P and s
∗
F exhibit the same intuition as in section 2, and the require-
ments on α also contributes to a more important role of belief discount δˆ. In the ex-
treme case of α = 1, for instance, shadow effect disappears and Sˆ < S∗ for all θ > 0.
At the first stage, a higher expected payoff from the second stage raises the pio-
neer’s incentive to search for the basic invention. Let u∗P be the pioneer’s second-stage
payoff under θ = 0. Compare it with uˆP, the payoff under θ > 0:
u∗P =
∫ G−1P (s∗P)
0
(v− cP)dGP =
∫ G−1P (sˆP)
0
(v− cP)dGP +
∫ G−1P (s∗P)
G−1P (sˆP)
(v− cP)dGP
<
∫ G−1P (sˆP)
0
(v− cP)dGP +
∫ G−1P (s∗P)
G−1P (sˆP)
sˆFθvdGP < uˆP,
(8)
due to s∗P > sˆP and cˆF > 0, as well as the definition of sˆP. Consistent with previous
studies, the DPSM (θ = 0) imposes a cost of hampering basic invention.
Proposition 2. (Effect of basic patent) Granting patent protection to the basic invention in-
creases the pioneer’s first-stage incentive, but reduces her incentive to continue at the second
stage, for all θ ∈ (0, θ], uˆP > u∗P and sˆP < s∗P. Due to shadow effect, its impacts on the
follower’s incentive and the second-stage performance are ambiguous, s∗F ≷ sˆF and S
∗ ≷ Sˆ.
Taking into account its overall impact, when is it optimal to impose the DPSM in
order to promote technology progress? That is, when is θ = 0 the solution to the
program maxθ αG
1(uˆP)Sˆ? Fixing α, it is equivalent to finding conditions such that
G1(u∗P)S
∗ ≥ G1(uˆP)Sˆ for all θ ∈ (0, θ].
According to Proposition 2, the DPSM reduces incentives at the first stage. If, at
the second stage, S∗ < Sˆ for some θ ∈ (0, θ], then the DPSM is dominated at both
stages. A necessary condition for the DPSM to be optimal is that this policy facilitates
second-stage innovation, namely, Sˆ < S∗ for all θ ∈ (0, θ].
Suppose that this necessary condition holds. Consider a marginal change in θ:
dG1(uˆP)Sˆ
dθ
=SˆG1
′
(1− sˆP)vdθsˆF
dθ
+ G1
[
(1− sˆF)dsˆP
dθ
+ (1− sˆP)dsˆF
dθ
]
. (9)
As discussed above, a basic patent encourages the first-stage innovation (G1(uˆP) >
G1(u∗P)) and changes the follower’s innovation performance (dsˆF/dθ ≷ 0). This inter-
mediate reward also discourages the pioneer from continuing to do research (sˆP < s
∗
P).
The cumulative innovation literature, such as Green and Scotchmer (1995), focuses on
the trade-off between the first two forces, but overlooks the third decision, namely,
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the same inventor’s innovation incentives across stages. If the negative impact on the
pioneer’s second-stage incentive dominates, then the basic invention should not be
patentable in order to preserve her continuation efforts.
When G′P 6= 0, the first-order condition is equivalent to[
(1− sˆF)G1 − (1− sˆP)SˆG
1′
G′P
]
dsˆP
dθ
+ (1− sˆP)G1 dsˆF
dθ
. (10)
Since dsˆP/dθ < 0, the whole term is negative when dsˆF/dθ ≤ 0 and
(1− sˆF)G1 > (1− sˆP)SˆG
1′
G′P
. (11)
The first requirement holds when sharing effect dominates shadow effect in the fol-
lower’s decision. The second requirement holds for a low sˆF and a high sˆP, i.e., when
innovation capacity at the second stage is located at the pioneer, but not the follower.
To better understand the argument, consider special cost distributions. First let cF
take a two-point distribution, cF ∈ {0, v+ ε}, with ε > 0 and Pr(cF = 0) = sF ∈ (0, 1).
The follower’s fixed capacity, sˆF = s
∗
F = sF, mutes shadow effect and ensures the
necessary condition S∗ > Sˆ. This simplification illustrates how the follower’s capacity
sF affects the trade-off between the pioneer’s incentives at different stages.
Holding sF constant, higher θ always raises the pioneer’s first-stage incentives and
reduces her second-stage incentives:
duˆP
dθ
= (1− sˆP)sFv > 0 and dSˆ
dθ
= −(1− sF)sFvG′P < 0. (12)
Note that sF appears in both terms. A more capable follower produces a higher sur-
plus that can be transferred to the pioneer via patent rights, which gives the pioneer
stronger incentives to discover the basic invention, but at the same time also allows
her to save on her search activity at the second stage. Besides this common factor,
the positive boost on uˆP is also proportional to 1− sˆP, the probability that the pioneer
does not search for application, for only in this event could the surplus transfer occur.
On the other hand, the negative impact on Sˆ is proportional to 1 − sF, for a lower
search effort from the pioneer has a more severe consequence when the follower is
less likely to make the discovery. The DPSM may be optimal when the pioneer has
significant search capacity (and so sˆP is high for all θ ∈ [0, θ]), but not the follower
(and so sF is small).
Let’s further assume that c1 and cP take uniform distribution, c
1 ∼ UNIF[0, 1/K1]
and cP ∼ UNIF[0, 1/KP], where both K1 and KP < 1/v. With dsˆP/dθ < 0 = dsˆF/dθ,
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the DPSM becomes the optimal policy when condition (11) holds, or [(1 − sF)uˆP −
(1− sˆP)(Sˆ/KP)]K1 > 0, for all θ ≥ 0. By integration by parts and the optimal strategy
sˆP = KPv(1− θsF),
uˆP = (v− cP)GP(cP)|G
−1
P (sˆP)
0 +
∫ G−1P (sˆP)
0
GPdcP + (1− sˆP)sFvθ
>
∫ G−1P (sˆP)
0
GPdcP =
KP
2
[(1− θsF)v]2 = sˆ
2
P
2KP
,
(13)
and so
(1− sF)KPuˆP − (1− sˆP)Sˆ > (1− sF) sˆ
2
P
2
− (1− sˆP)[sF + (1− sF)sˆP]
= (1− sF)sˆP
(
3
2
sˆP − 1
)
− sF(1− sˆP).
(14)
Note that s∗P = KPv and so sˆP = s
∗
P(1− θsF). When s∗P increases and sF reduces, this
term becomes positive for all θ. Denying patent protection to the basic invention is
more likely to be optimal when the pioneer’s capacity of application search expands
and that of the follower shrinks. The following proposition shows that this result
holds when cF also follows uniform distribution.
19
Proposition 3. The DPSM is not the optimal policy to promote the technology progress if there
is some θ > 0 such that Sˆ ≥ S∗.
The DPSM is the optimal policy if the first-order condition (10) is negative for all θ ∈
[0, θ]. When all search costs follow uniform distributions, the DPSM is optimal when KP is
sufficiently large and KF sufficiently small.
The uniform distribution of c1, the cost of basic innovation, brings about an inter-
esting case: the optimal policy θ is independent of the cost parameter at this stage,
K1 here. Different from Aoki and Nagaoka (2007), within the class of uniform distri-
butions, I can derive the optimality of the DPSM without referring to the difficulty of
obtaining the basic invention.
19If, instead, the pioneer has a fixed and costless capacity sP at the second stage, the optimal θ is deter-
mined according to the classical trade-off between different inventor’s incentives at different stages. And
the case of sP = 0 corresponds to the standard model where different generations of innovations are con-
ducted by different players. Let δ be the belief discount corresponding to sP, which is also fixed; shadow
effect also disappears. Higher θ always reduces second-stage incentives: dSˆ/dθ = (1 − sP)(dsˆF/dθ) =
−(1− sP)G′Fδv. The first-order condition has the same sign as G1
′
Sˆ(sˆF − θδvG′F)− G1δG′F. (Note that the
expression (10) doesn’t apply for G′P = 0.) If both c
1 and cF take uniform distributions, the sign is deter-
mined by −2θsP + (1− 3θ)(1− sP)sˆF, which is strictly positive at θ = 0. The DPSM is not optimal.
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4 Discussion
This section discusses implications and robustness issues.
 Pioneer’s first-mover advantage: In light of Proposition 3, the DPSM should
be imposed when the pioneer has superior ability at the subsequent research stage,
but not the follower. The pioneermay acquire this advantage due to previous engage-
ment in basic research, e.g.,through knowledge accumulation or learning-by-doing.
The follower may not benefit from this knowledge accumulation either because the
pioneer lacks incentives to help information dissemination and absorption, or because
of the tacit nature and so the intrinsic difficulty to transfer knowledge among different
inventors. The former may be addressed by the disclosure requirement in patent law.
In this regard, the result here supports the conventional wisdom that the patent sys-
tem should be designed to facilitate technology diffusion: The basic patent should not
be issued when weak disclosure or enablement requirements significantly hampers
other parties’ ability to exploit the patented technology. The reason here, however, is
to preserve the pioneer’s incentive of continuation. The latter, on the other hand, de-
pends on a late-comer’s ability to assemble and digest necessary knowledge in order
to effectively participate in the innovation process. To the extent that a nascent filed
is characterised by the concentration of important knowledge or innovation capacity
on a small number of key players, there may not be enough capable followers who
can readily pursue the pioneer’s research line, and the basic invention should not be
patentable.
The second stage of the model can also be interpreted as commercialization. A
party has better commercialization capacity when, for instance, she controls key phys-
ical assets that facilitate the design andmarketing of the basic invention. The previous
assumption that the second-stage result is patentable then is replaced by the protec-
tion of tangible property. The condition identified in Proposition 3 implies that the
optimal patent policy hinges on the degree of vertical integration: the basic invention
should not be patentable when the upstream pioneer extends her dominance to the
downstream stage of commercialization.
 Research grant and academic kudos: Basic research is often funded by re-
search grants, and reputation or recognition from the scientific community (“kudos”)
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may provide strong incentive for academic researchers (Gans et al., 2010).20 These
alternative incentive mechanisms avoid the negative sharing effect on the follower.
However, they may trigger severe shadow effect and be inferior to the patent system.
Suppose that the pioneer receives a reward R > 0 after completing the first-stage
innovation. This reward does not affect the second-stage decisions. Consider two
cases. First, let R be a policy instrument (e.g., research grant) that is also controlled by
the patent authority (e.g., the Congress). In possession of two instruments, the policy
maker can set the patent policy θ to address the second-stage performance, and adjust
incentives at the first stage with research grant R. This separation, however, does not
necessarily vindicate the DPSM. When Sˆ > S∗ for some θ, it is still optimal to issue
the basic patent.
Next, suppose that R is not controlled by the patent authority. It may be reputation-
based (scientific kudos, citations), or research grant provided by another agency (e.g.,
National Science Foundation or National Institutes of Health in the U.S.) or private
organizations (e.g., the Nobel Prize). The policy maker then chooses the patent policy
θ taking as given the “extra” boost for basic innovation. Again, patent protection to
the basic invention is optimal if it benefits the second stage.
Suppose that patent protection always hurts the second stage, Sˆ < S∗ for all θ > 0.
It is optimal to impose the DPSM if, for all θ > 0
[G1(R+ u∗P)/G
1(R+ uˆP)] > (Sˆ/S
∗), (15)
where uˆP and Sˆ are computed at the the corresponding θ. When the left-hand side
is increasing in R, as in the case of uniform distribution, higher R moves the optimal
patent policy towards the DPSM.
Proposition 4. (Alternative rewards to basic invention) When shadow effect give rises to the
beneficial effect of the basic patent on the second-stage innovation, the DPSM is not optimal
regardless of the introduction of non-patent reward R.
 Policy package: In the end of section 2, the parameter pi is interpreted as patent
protection the application receives. Applying this interpretation to the framework of
20Reputation or similar concerns (such as a Nobel Prize) may also provide strong incentives to disclose
basic invention in the absence of patent protection. Scientists may also prefermore challenging tasks (Sauer-
mann and Cohen, 2007, Owan and Nagaoka, 2008), namely, there is an intrinsic (psychological) reward that
is decreasing in the belief that the application can be found. Although shadow effect is weakened by such
reward, previous results hold as long as its magnitude is not too large.
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section 3, the patent authoritymay tackle the two-stage incentives problemwith a pol-
icy package (θ,pi). Interestingly, ∂Sˆ/∂θ > 0 at θ = 0 implies ∂Sˆ/∂pi < 0 at θ = 0. The
same shadow effect that provides the basic patent with a benefit at the second stage
also ensures a similar benefit by slightly reducing patent protection to the application.
One might conjecture that, if, for reasons not considered here, the policy maker would
like to keep the basic invention unpatentable, then it may be beneficial to reduce the
protection to the application as well. The answer to this question, which involves
first-stage incentives, as well as the complete characterization of optimal policy are
left for future research.
Proposition 5. Evaluating at θ = 0, ∂Sˆ/∂θ > 0 implies ∂Sˆ/∂pi < 0.
 Licensing and information disclosure: Two issues in the previousmodelmay
prompt licensing. First, excessive protection to the basic invention may be detrimen-
tal to both the pioneer and follower. Second, the follower is interested in the pioneer’s
private information at time 1, namely, what the pioneer has learned about α according
to her search activity. Let’s consider these two issues in turn.21 Limited liability con-
strains the licensing space to revenue-sharing rules (royalty terms) between the two
parties. Let l ∈ [0, 1] be the portion of pi transferred from the follower to the pioneer,
when the former discovers the application. The patent policy θ determines the two
parties’ outside option during negotiation.
An extreme example of excessive patent protection is θ = 1, whereby the follower
does not search at all. Lemma 1 gives a more general condition, namely, dsˆP/dθ ≥ 0,
that implies that both parties benefit from a lower θ. The policy space [0, θ], with
θ < 1, can also be seen as the values of θ that are “licensing-proof,” and will prevail
after taking into account of licensing. 22
For the second issue, the pioneer’s private information allows the follower to ei-
ther save search cost (when the pioneer fails), or restore his search incentives (when
the pioneer does not search). A failed pioneer (at the second stage) has no interest
in the follower’s innovation activity, for she knows that the follower won’t succeed,
21I do not consider licensing to disclose the basic invention. When the basic invention is patentable, the
pioneer benefits from the follower’s search activity. When θ = 0, disclosure does not harm the pioneer, and
she may decide to publish it for reputation concerns. Appendix C discusses the disclosure decision in a
two-stage Poisson race model.
22Under uniform distributions, for example, dsˆP/dθ ≥ 0 for all θ ≥ 1/2. For this issue, the exact timing
of licensing, namely, whether the negotiation occurs before or after the pioneer has made her second-stage
search decision, does not matter. In both cases, the pioneer’s licensing payoff is proportional to θ · sˆF.
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either. By contrast, a pioneer who didn’t search at the second stage will want to get
a stake, and give her private information to the follower in order to raise the latter’s
incentives. Breaking the failed pioneer’s indifference in different manners generates
different information transmission outcomes. This indifference, however, is not ro-
bust to a modification that introduces mistakes in pioneer’s search.23
Suppose that, even if the pioneer incurs cP to search, there is some probability
ε ∈ (0, 1) that shewon’t find an existing application. The pioneer’s failure, then, is still
a bad news, but not as desperate as before. Her updated belief about the existence of
the application is αε = εα/(1− α + εα) ∈ (0, α). Given licensing term l, the pioneer’s
expected licensing income is αPGF(α˜
l(1− l)pi)lpi, where αP ∈ {α, αε} is the pioneer’s
“type”, and α˜l is the follower’s updated belief according to the licensing outcome,
transmitted through the contractual term l. Both types of pioneer aim to maximise
GF(α˜
l(1− l)pi). There is an equilibrium in the licensing negotiation subgame where
the pioneer’s strategy does not depend on her private information, and the follower
learns nothing. The qualitative feature of shadow effect is retained.24
 Structure of innovation market: In a two-stage homogeneous Poisson race
where inventors possess identical research capacity, the pioneer in Aoki and Nagaoka
(2007), i.e., the first inventor to finish the first race, will exert her patent rights to
block opponents’ entry into the second race.25 The pioneer does not benefit from oth-
ers’ innovation capacity. The basic patent generates a monopoly at the second stage,
and increases the concentration of the innovation market, as measured by the extent
to which different inventions are created by different inventors, given completion of
both stages.
In my model, by contrast, the pioneer uses the basic patent to extract surplus from
the follower. Conditional on discovery, the probability that the follow discovers is
[(1− sˆP)sˆF]/Sˆ under θ > 0, which is greater than the probability under the DPSM,
23When the true level of cP is the pioneer’s private information and whether she has spent this cost
is non-verifiable, it is unclear which patent policy tool could be used to induce the pioneer to disclose this
information. Since patents are public records, whenever the identity of following inventors are unknown ex
ante, it may be difficult to enforce patent rights whose disclosure helps others to not conducting innovation.
24Relaxing the limited liability constraint, the follower may be able to purchase the pioneer’s private
information with cash. But in general the optimal licensing term is no more a surplus-sharing rule. I do not
pursue this question here.
25Aoki andNagaoka (2007) considers a two-point policy space, the basic invention is either not patentable
or infringed for sure, and uses social welfare as the policy objective, which consists of inventors’ profit and
a social benefit of the application not accrued to inventors.
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[(1− s∗P)s∗F]/S∗ if s∗P(1− sˆP)sˆF > sˆP(1− s∗P)s∗F. Since s∗P > sˆP, as long as sˆF/s∗F is not too
small, the basic patent helps the decentralization of innovation activities. And since
shadow effect mitigates the negative impact of θ on sˆF, it reinforces the disintegration
caused by the patent policy.
Multiple equilibria at the second stage: Mutual dependence of sˆP and sˆF, in-
duced by basic patent (θ > 0) and shadow effect (α < 1), may generate multiple equi-
libria at the second innovation stage. Along the equilibrium path, higher sˆP reduces
the follower’s search intensity sˆF via a lower belief discount factor δˆ. The reduction
in sˆF in turn justifies the initial increase in sˆP. By the same token, expecting a higher
search probability from the follower, the pioneer will lower her search effort, whereby
causes a higher updated belief and so higher incentive to search by the follower.
Two-point cost distributions provide the simplest example. For i ∈ {P, F}, let
ci ∈ {ki, v + ε}, with v ≥ ki ≥ 0 and ε > 0, and the probability of low search cost
is Pr(ci = ki) = si ∈ (0, 1). Inventor i ∈ {P, F} does not incur the high cost v + ε,
and searches at most with probability si. For (0, sF) to be an equilibrium, the pioneer
must prefer to wait and let the follower search, kP > v(1− sFθ); and, given that the
pioneer does not search, the follower has belief discount δˆ = 1 and is willing to search
when kF ≤ v(1− θ). For (sP, 0) to be an equilibrium, the pioneer will search when
she knows that the follow won’t, for kP ≤ v; and the follower, holding belief discount
δˆ = (1− sP)/(1− αsP), will not search when kF > (1− θ)δˆv. If all these conditions
hold, then both (sP, 0) and (0, sF) are equilibria at the second stage.
Multiple equilibria presents the possibility of inefficient allocation of search activ-
ity. Let sP = sF = s ∈ (0, 1) but kP 6= kF, and assume that both (0, s) and (s, 0) are both
equilibria. The total search probability is the same, Sˆ = s, but search cost is smaller
in one equilibrium than in the other. When kP > kF, the equilibrium where only the
follower searches is more cost-efficient.
Lastly, let sF > sP. The DPSM leads to unique equilibrium (sP, 0), with S
∗ = sP.
But when multiple equilibria (sP, 0) and (0, sF) ensue under some θ > 0, the total
search probability is Sˆ = sF > S
∗ in the equilibrium (0, sF). When the “good” equilib-
rium prevails, the basic patent boosts the second-stage innovation performance and
encourages market disintegration, (1− s∗P)s∗F/S∗ = 0 < (1− sˆP)sˆF/Sˆ = 1.
 Patent policy and joint surplus: The DPSM does not maximise the two inven-
tor’s joint surplus. Raising θ slightly above zero only exerts a negative impact on the
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follower’s payoff uˆF. This negative effect, however, is offset by a positive impact on
the pioneering inventor’s payoff uˆP. Protecting the basic invention with some patent
rights therefor benefit the innovation sector as a whole.
Proposition 6. The DPSM does not maximise the joint surplus of the two inventors.
5 Multiple Applications: Shadow and Sunshine
Since “There falls no shadow where there shines no sun (Hilaire Belloc, poet),” this
section considersmore general information spill-over, where the pioneer’s search out-
come may be a good (sunshine) or bad news (shadow) to the follower. Very often
researchers have different ideas about how to apply a basic invention (Murray et al.,
2009). Let the pioneer and follower pursue different applications, but maintain the
assumptions that the pioneer moves before the follower, and that the follower only
observes whether the pioneer has come up with her application or not. Inventors will
disclose the discovered application (in order to, for instance, receive patent protec-
tion). I focus on the application search stage, but also consider the impact of basic
patent θ. For simplicity, let each application generate a return pi > 0 (Appendix B
considers payoff externality). The pioneer gets a payoff 2pi when the follower’s ap-
plication infringes on the pioneer’s patent.
Denote aP = 1 (aP = 0) as the event where the pioneer’s application exists (does
not exist, respectively); similarly for aF ∈ {0, 1}. To generate information spill-over,
aP should provide information about aF. Suppose that the follower’s application has
ex ante existence probability Pr(aF = 1) = αF ∈ (0, 1]. For both aF ∈ {0, 1},
Pr(aP = aF|aF) = ρ ∈ [0, 1], (16)
i.e., the existence or not of pioneer’s application coincides with that of the follower’s
with probability ρ. A “signal” aP = 1 is generated, and the pioneer’s application exists
with ex ante probability αP ≡ αF · ρ + (1− αF)(1− ρ). By Bayes’ rule, when learning
aP = 1, the updated assessment about the follower’s application is (α · ρ)/αP; and
when observing aP = 0, the updated belief is [αF(1− ρ)]/(1− αP). Denote δ+ ≡ ρ/αP
and δ− ≡ (1− ρ)/(1− αP). When ρ = 1/2, δ+ = 1 = δ−, learning aP provides no
information about aF . When ρ > 1/2, the two applications’ existence probability are
positively correlated, with δ+ > 1 > δ−: observing aP = 1 (aP = 0) raises (reduces,
respectively) the updated belief about aF. The reverse is true for ρ < 1/2.
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The follower, however, only observes aP = 1, but not aP = 0. As before, no
application from the pioneer also includes the possibility that she did not search at
all. Given the pioneer’s search probability sˆP, the follower’s updated belief is
(1− sˆP)αF + sˆPαF(1− ρ)
(1− sˆP) + sˆP(1− αP) = αF
1− sˆPρ
1− sˆPαP . (17)
Let δˆ− ≡ (1− sˆPρ)/(1− sˆPαP). When sˆP → 1 (sˆP → 0), δˆ− → δ− (δˆ− → 1, respec-
tively). The pioneer’s inaction dilutes the information content of this event.
Denote vi ≡ αi · pi, i ∈ {P, F}. The follower exerts probability to search sˆ+F =
GF((1 − θ)δ+vF) when observing that the pioneer has found her application, and
sˆ−F = GF((1− θ)δˆ−vF) otherwise. Higher θ always reduces sˆ+F . But, similar to pre-
vious analysis, patent policy exerts two effects on sˆ−F : a direct negative effect, and an
indirect, belief effect via δˆ−.
For the pioneer, not searching generates an expected licensing income, αF sˆ
−
F θpi,
and the payoff from incurring cP to search is
− cP + αP
{
αFδ
+sˆ+F [θ · 2pi + (1− θ)pi] + (1− αFδ+sˆ+F )pi
}
+ (1− αP)αFδ− sˆ−F θpi
=− cP + vP + ρvFθ(sˆ+F − sˆ−F ) + sˆ−F θvF.
(18)
The pioneer fails with probability 1− αP, and will update her belief about the fol-
lower’s application according to δ−. With probability αP, the pioneer successfully
develops her application, and the payoff depends on the follower’s outcome as well
as the resolution of patent dispute. The pioneer searches when
cP ≤ vP + ρvFθ(sˆ+F − sˆ−F ), (19)
which determines the search probability sˆP. Since sˆ
+
F is uniquely determined by the
patent policy θ, a rational expectation equilibrium is characterised by a mutually con-
sistent pair sˆP and sˆ
−
F .
Here the pioneer can no longer “delegate” her search to the follower. Hence patent
policy θ does not alter the impact of vP on sˆP. The impact of θ hinges on which action,
searching or not, generates a higher licensing income from the follower. Not searching
leads to the belief discount δˆ− and induces the follower to search with probability
sˆ−F . If the pioneer searches, she may succeed with a probability, which then changes
the follower’s belief to δ+ and search probability to sˆ+F . The difference in follower’s
search behavior, sˆ+F − sˆ−F , determines how patent policy affects the pioneer’s search
incentives. In the absence of information spill-over, ρ = 1/2 and so δˆ− = δ+ = 1 for
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all sˆP, the follower exerts the same search effort, sˆ
+
F = sˆ
−
F . The basic patent does not
affect the pioneer’s search incentives, sˆP = GP(vP) for all θ, but only has a negative
impact on the follower.
When the existence probabilities are positively correlated (ρ > 1/2), the follower’s
search probabilities exhibit sˆ+F > sˆ
−
F , for δ
+
> 1 > δˆ− for all θ and sˆP. No discovery
from the pioneer still casts shadow on the follower’s endeavor, but the appearance of
pioneer’s application will “brighten” the follower’s prospect. The pioneer’s stake in
the follower’s search raises her incentive, with the intention to send the follower to the
“bright” path and exerts sˆ+F .
26 For all θ > 0, sˆP = GP(vP + ρθvF(sˆ
+
F − sˆ−F )) > GP(vP).
Higher search probability, however, further weakens the follower’s search probability
sˆ−F , due to a shadow discount that is decreasing in sˆP: ∂δˆ
−/∂sˆP = −[(1− αF)(2ρ −
1)]/(1− sˆPαP)2 < 0.
When ρ ∈ (0, 1/2), the two applications’ existence probability are negatively cor-
related. Shadow and sunshine project at the opposite events: The pioneer’s dis-
covery is a bad news for the follower while silence is a good news, and sˆ+F < sˆ
−
F
follows δ+ < 1 < δˆ−. The basic patent reduces the pioneer’s search incentive,
GP(vP + ρθvF(sˆ
+
F − sˆ−F )) < GP(vP) for all θ ∈ (0, 1). Since now ∂δˆ−/∂sˆP > 0, a re-
duction in sˆP again further reduces sˆ
−
F .
An interesting case occurs for ρ = 0, and so αP = 1− αF, i.e., the two applications
do not co-exist: Patent policy θ does not change the pioneer’s search decision, which
is fixed at sˆP = GP(vP). This is because the pioneer’s search decision does not affect
licensing income. If the pioneer does not search, she expects the follower’s application
to exist with probability αF, and the follower to exert search probability sˆ
−
F . When
the pioneer searches, licensing payment may accrue only when her own search fails,
which occurs with probability 1− αP = αF. The follower’s search probability in this
event is also sˆ−F . Patent policy θ only negatively affects the follower.
To sum up, when inventors pursue different applications, the basic patent always
reduces the follower’s incentives, sˆ+F and sˆ
−
F . Information spill-over, nevertheless,
provides positive impacts that work through the pioneer here. First, the basic patent
induces higher search probability from the pioneer under positive correlation. Sec-
ond, the pioneer’s incentive to “select sunshine over shadow,” caused by θ > 0, fur-
ther mitigates the negative impact on the follower. The ex ante probability that the
26Since the follower does not observe sˆP, the pioneer cannot act as a Stackelberg leader and intentionally
choose her search probability to manipulate the follower’s belief.
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follower will develop his application,
αP sˆPαFδ
+sˆ+F + (1− αP sˆP)αFδˆ− sˆ−F = αF
[
ρsˆP sˆ
+
F + (1− ρsˆP)sˆ−F
]
, (20)
contains a weighted average between sˆ+F and sˆ
−
F . When ρ > 1/2, sˆ
+
F > sˆ
−
F . Setting
θ > 0 reduces both sˆ+F and sˆ
−
F , but at the same time raises sˆP, and so puts more weight
on the high search probability end. Similarly, when 0 < ρ < 1/2, sˆ+F < sˆ
−
F , and the
smaller sˆP induced by θ > 0 moves the weighted average toward sˆ
−
F .
27 Except for
perfectly negative correlation, the introduction of information spill-over uncovers an
incentive effect that would be missing otherwise.
Proposition 7. When inventors pursue different applications and there is payoff independence,
rewarding the pioneer with patent rights discourages the follower’s application search, but
may raise or reduce the pioneer’s incentive to develop her application.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I analyzed how the basic patent affects the cumulative innovation pro-
cess in the presence of shadow effect, namely, the dimer prospect of future research
given previous failed attempts. Shadow effect gives the basic patent a more friendly
role to subsequent innovation and helps disintegration of the innovation market. To
justify the DPSM, i.e., to reject patent protection to the basic invention, therefore, re-
quires weak shadow effect. The DPSM may be the optimal policy to induce the pio-
neering inventor’s continuation efforts.
For future research, it would be interesting to check the empirical validation of the
predictions derived the shadow effect, for instance, the one concerning the concentra-
tion of the innovation market. An empirical support of shadow effect would invite us
to re-evaluate policy recommendations from economic theory and take into account
the more subtle role (basic) patents play in innovation, as demonstrated in this paper.
Concerning patent policy, the sufficient condition of the optimality of the DPSM is
derived under specific cost distributions. It would be important to test its robustness
in more general settings. Since research capacity (cost distribution here) may not be
27Murray et al. (2009) provides empirical results that more research paths were explored after the relax-
ation of (patent-backed) restrictions on the use and distribution of genetically engineered mice, which are
used as research tools. They do not distinguish between pioneers and followers. (The latter group might
roughtly be identified as scientists not working for DuPont, the owner of patents under study.) To the extent
that most researchers belong to the second category, their findings are consistent with the result here.
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easily identified, future work should also develop other fundamental elements that
are easier for policy-makers to apply.
A few issues deserve more attentions: multiple pioneers at the first-stage innova-
tion as in Denicolo` (2000) andAoki andNagaoka (2007); secrecy protection to the basic
invention; and the optimal combination of the DPSM with other policy instruments,
to name a few. A better understanding of the doctrine of the patentable subject mat-
ter would advance our knowledge on the optimal design of the patent system. This
paper constitutes an early step.
Appendix
A Proofs
 Lemma 1
Proof. Suppose
dsˆP
dθ
= −G′Pv
d(θsˆF)
dθ
≥ 0, (21)
which requires d(θsˆF)/dθ ≤ 0. By the envelope theorem,
duˆP
dθ
= (1− sˆP)vd(θsˆF)
dθ
≤ 0 and duˆF
dθ
= sˆFv
[
−δˆ + (1− θ) ∂δˆ
∂sP
dsˆP
dθ
]
< 0, (22)
where ∂δˆ/∂sP ≤ 0 for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Q.E.D.
 Proposition 3
Proof. When G′P 6= 0, the expression (10) can be obtained by rewriting d(θsˆF)/dθ as a
function of dsˆP/dθ. Differentiate sˆP and sˆF, and let δˆ
′ ≡ ∂δˆ/∂sP :
dsˆP + θvG
′
PdsˆF = −sˆFvG′Pdθ (23)
−(1− θ)δˆ′vG′FdsˆP + dsˆF = −δˆvG′Fdθ. (24)
By Cramer’s rule,
dsˆP
dθ
= −vG
′
P
△ (sˆF − θδˆvG
′
F) and
dsˆF
dθ
= −vG
′
F
△
[
δˆ + (1− θ)δˆ′ sˆFvG′P
]
, (25)
25
where △ = 1 + θ(1 − θ)δˆ′v2G′PG′F. For small shadow effect, δˆ′ → 0, △ > 0 and
dsˆF/dθ < 0.
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Let c1 ∼ UNIF[0, 1/K1] and ci ∼ UNIF[0, 1/Ki], i ∈ {P, F}. When both KP and
KF < 1/v, there is unique equilibrium at the second stage. Expressing sˆF in terms of
sˆP (via δˆ), a solution of the following equation corresponds to a search equilibrium:
sˆP = GP
(
(1− θGF((1− θ)δˆv))v
)
= KPv
[
1− θ(1− θ) 1− sˆP
1− αsˆPKFv
]
. (26)
By KFv < 1, the right-hand side is strictly positive. Since KPv < 1, for all θ ∈ (0, 1),
sˆP = 1 is not a solution, and in equilibrium 1− αsˆP > 0. An equilibrium is a solution
of the following quadratic equation:
αsˆ2P − {1+ KPv[α − θ(1− θ)KFv]} sˆP + KPv[1− θ(1− θ)KFv] = 0. (27)
Let B = 1+ KPv[α − θ(1− θ)KFv] and C = KPv[1− θ(1− θ)KFv]. Note that C < 1.
The determinant is strictly positive, for B2 − 4αC equals to
{1− KPv[α + θ(1− θ)KFv]}2 + 4αθ(1− θ)KPvKFv(1− KPv) > 0. (28)
Since B >
√
B2 − 4αC, both roots are positive. The root (B−√B2− 4αC)/(2α) is the
unique solution if
B−√B2 − 4αC
2α
< 1 <
B+
√
B2 − 4αC
2α
, (29)
or, equivalently,
√
B2 − 4αC > max{B − 2α, 2α − B}. When B > 2α, it suffices to
check
√
B2 − 4αC > B− 2α, or,
B2 − 4αC > B2 − 4αB+ 4α2 ⇒ B > C+ α ⇒ 1− α > KPv(1− α), (30)
which holds for KPv < 1. Similar for the case of B ≤ 2α.
Under uniform distributions,
△ = 1− θ(1− θ)KPvKFv 1− α
(1− αsˆP)2 = 1−
(1− α)θs∗P sˆF
(1− αsˆP)(1− sˆP) , (31)
for s∗P = KPv and sˆF = KFv(1− θ)δˆ. By sˆP = KPv(1− θsˆF) = s∗P(1− θsˆF),
(1− αsˆP)(1− sˆP) = (1− αsˆP)(1− s∗P + θs∗P sˆF) > (1− αsˆP)θs∗P sˆF > (1− α)θs∗P sˆF. (32)
28On the sˆP − sˆF plane, a stable equilibrium (sˆP, sˆF) guarantees △ > 0 for it requires that the pioneer’s
reaction curve have a larger slope (in absolute value) than the follower’s reaction curve.
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The denominator△ > 0. Given so,
dsˆP
dθ
= −KPvKFv△ δˆ(1− 2θ), (33)
which is strictly negative for all θ < 1/2; and
dsˆF
dθ
= −KFv△ δˆ
[
1− (1− θ)(1− α)
(1− sˆP)(1− αsˆP)2 sˆFKPv
]
= −KFv△
[
1− (1− α)(1− θ)
2s∗P
(1− αsˆP)3 KFv
]
. (34)
If KF is sufficiently small, e.g. if KFv < (1− αs∗P)3/[(1− α)s∗P], this term is also nega-
tive. In this case, it suffices to check the expression (11), or (1− sˆF)uˆPKP > (1− sˆP)Sˆ.
Expressed in term of sˆF,
Sˆ = sˆF + (1− sˆF)(1− θsˆF)KPv = s∗P [1+ xsˆF − (1− sˆF)y] , (35)
and
uˆP = θsˆFv+
s∗2P
2KP
(1− θsˆF)2 = s
∗2
P
2KP
(
1+ 2xy+ y2
)
, (36)
where x ≡ (1/s∗P)− 1 > 0 and y ≡ θsˆF. The sufficient condition becomes
(1− sˆF) s
∗2
P
2
(1+ 2xy+ y2) > s∗2P (x+ y)[1+ xsˆF − (1− sˆF)y]
⇔(1− sˆF)[1+ y(4x+ 3y)] > 2(x+ y)(1+ xsˆF).
(37)
This condition holds when both x and sˆF are sufficiently small. The former requires a
sufficiently large KP (and so s
∗
P), and the latter a sufficiently small KF. Q.E.D.
 Proposition 5
Proof. By the proof of Proposition 3, suppose that
∂Sˆ
∂θ
∣∣
θ=0
= −v
[
(1− s∗F)s∗FG′P + (1− s∗P)δ∗G′F + (1− s∗P)s∗Fδ∗
′
G′PG
′
Fv
]
> 0, (38)
which implies that 1− s∗F + (1− s∗P)δ∗
′
G′Fv < 0. The comparative statics result with
respect to pi is
∂sˆP
∂pi
=
αG′P
△
[
1− θsˆF − θ(1− θ)δˆvG′F
]
and
∂sˆF
∂pi
= (1− θ)αG
′
F
△
[
δˆ + (1− θsˆF)δˆ′G′Pv
]
, (39)
where△ is defined in the proof of Proposition 3. Evaluating at θ = 0,
∂Sˆ
∂pi
∣∣
θ=0
=α
[
(1− s∗F)G′P + (1− s∗P)δ∗G′F + (1− s∗P)δ∗
′
G′PG
′
Fv
]
=α
{
(1− s∗F)s∗FG′P + (1− s∗P)δ∗G′F + (1− s∗P)s∗Fδ∗
′
G′PG
′
Fv
+ (1− s∗F)G′P[1− s∗F + (1− s∗P)δ∗
′
G′Fv]
}
,
(40)
must also be strictly negative. Q.E.D.
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 Proposition 6
Proof. The joint surplus from the ex ante point of view is
U =
∫ uˆP
0
(uˆP − c1)dG1 + G1(uˆP)(1− αsˆP)uˆF. (41)
The follower receives uˆF only when the basic invention is created and the pioneer
does not come up with the application. The impact of the policy θ is
dU
dθ
= G1(uˆP)
duˆP
dθ
+ (1− αsˆP)G1′(uˆP)uˆF duˆP
dθ
− G1(uˆP)
[
αuˆF
dsˆP
dθ
− (1− αsˆP)duˆF
dθ
]
, (42)
where duˆP/dθ and duˆF/dθ can be found in the proof of Lemma 1. At θ = 0, duˆP/dθ =
(1− s∗P)s∗Fv > 0. Using the comparative static results in the proof of Proposition 3,
△ = 1 and dsˆP/dθ = −s∗FvG′P < 0. The only negative term in dU/dθ occurs in
duˆF/dθ, namely, −G1(u∗P)(1− s∗P)s∗Fv. It is exactly offset by the first term in dU/dθ.
Therefore, dU/dθ > 0 at θ = 0. Q.E.D.
B Multiple Applications with Correlated Payoffs
This appendix introduces payoff externality into the multiple-application setting in
section 5. Assume symmetric payoffs. When there is one application, the payoff is
pi > 0. If two applications are developed and put into use, then each generates a
payoff γpi, where γ ≥ 0. When γ > 1 (γ < 1), the two applications are comple-
ments (substitutes), for one’s appearance raises (reduces, respectively) the value of
the other. Payoff externality introduces another use of patent rights: the pioneer can
grant a license and grab the full joint surplus 2γpi, or block the use of the follower’s
application, with a payoff pi.29 Let b = max{2γ, 1} ≥ 1. The pioneer grants a license
when b = 2γ, but blocks the follower’s application when b = 1.
Payoff externality only changes the follower’s search probability when observing
the pioneer’s application, which is now sˆ+F = GF((1− θ)δ+γvF). In the other event,
his search probability is still sˆ−F = GF((1− θ)δˆ−vF). The pioneer’s payoff from not
searching is still αF sˆ
−
F θpi, and the payoff from incurring cP to search is now
− cP + αP
{
αFδ
+sˆ+F [θbpi + (1− θ)γpi] + (1− αFδ+sˆ+F )pi
}
+ (1− αP)αFδ− sˆ−F θpi
=− cP + vP + ρvF
{
θ[sˆ+F (b− γ)− sˆ−F ]− (1− γ)sˆ+F
}
+ sˆ−F θvF.
(43)
29The pioneer also obtains pi if she allows the follower’s application to be used, and at the same time
shuts down her own application. Although the pioneer always offers a license in this case, the final market
outcome is the same, namely, only one application is put in use. I ignore this scenario.
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When both players develop the applications, patent protection improves the pioneer’s
payoff by (b− γ)pi. The pioneer searches when
cP ≤ vP + ρvF
{
θ[sˆ+F (b− γ)− sˆ−F ]− (1− γ)sˆ+F
}
, (44)
which determines the search probability sˆP. Payoff externality exerts a directly effect
on the pioneer’s search incentive, with a magnitude proportional to the follower’s
search probability sˆ+F . Under payoff complementarity (γ > 1), a higher probability
that the follower will search and come up with an application raises the pioneer’s
incentive to do so; the reverse is true for payoff substitutability (γ < 1).
Absent information spill-over (ρ = 1/2), the effect of patent protection on the
pioneer crucially depends on the type of payoff externality. When γ > 1, sˆ+F > sˆ
−
F ,
and sˆ+F (b − γ) = γsˆ+F > sˆ−F , setting θ > 0 increases the pioneer’s search incentive
relative to θ = 0. The reverse is true for γ < 1, whether b = 2γ or 1.
Adding payoff externality to information spill-over distorts the pioneer’s search
decision in two ways: the impact of sˆ+F has to be weighted by b − γ ≷ 1, and the
relative size of sˆ+F and sˆ
−
F now also depends on γ. The two forces go in the same
direction when γ > 1 and ρ > 1/2, or when γ < 1 and ρ ∈ (0, 1/2). In the former
case, δ+ · γ > δˆ− for all sˆP, and so (b− γ)sˆ+F = γsˆ+F > sˆ−F . The basic patent raises the
pioneer’s search incentives, and reduces the follower’s search incentives sˆ+F and sˆ
−
F .
In the latter case, δ+ · γ < ˆδ− for all sˆP, and so (b− γ)sˆ+F < sˆ+F < sˆ−F . The basic patent
reduces both players’ search incentives (recall that by ρ < 1/2, sˆ−F is increasing in sˆP).
The two forces go in opposite directions in the remaining cases, with γ · δ+ ≷ δˆ−.
Consider only extreme cases where payoff externality dominates. When ρ ∈ (0, 1/2),
let γ > αP/[ρ · (1− αP)], such that γ · δ+ > δˆ−. Patent protection θ > 0 raises sˆP and
reduces both sˆ+F and sˆ
−
F . When ρ > 1/2, let γ < [(1− ρ)αP]/ρ, such that γ · δ+ < δˆ−.
Patent protection θ > 0 reduces sˆP and sˆ
+
F , but, via δˆ
−, there is a positive effect that
works against direct negative effect on sˆ−F . Note that the previous analysis in section
2 is equivalent to the case of ρ = 1 and γ = 0.
Perfectly negative correlation still causes the pioneer’s search decision sˆP = GP(vP)
for all θ and γ. Payoff externality (γ 6= 1) matters only when two applications could
both be developed, and so is irrelevant due to mutual exclusivity. 
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C Two-stage Race and Disclosure of Basic Inven-
tion
The fixed sequence of moves in the main analysis can be seen as a reduced form
of a two-stage Poisson race. This appendix sketches such a model. The idea is to
introduce exogenous delay in the disclosure process, so that a follower has to account
for the time lapses between when he learns the basic invention and when the pioneer
actually made the discovery.
Time runs continuously from zero to infinity. Two inventors, A (she) and B (he),
face a two-stage Poisson race from the beginning. The hazard rate at each stage is the
same for both inventors, and the arrival dates are independently distributed. Previous
innovation decision corresponds to the decision of entering a stage at a fixed, once-
and-for-all (but ex ante random) cost. The basic invention (the first-stage invention)
has a strictly positive hazard rate, but no stand-alone value. The application (the
second-stage invention) delivers a benefit pi > 0, but has a strictly positive hazard
rate λ > 0 only with probability α. Let r ≥ 0 be the common interest rate.30
An inventor decides whether to enter the second stage after learning the basic in-
vention, either by own discovery or through disclosure by the other inventor. After
discovering the basic invention, an inventor may disclose it via academic publica-
tion or patent application. For simplicity, I consider the two routes separately. Both
processes involve delay from submission to publication: in most jurisdictions, most
patent applications are published 18 months after filing; and the referring process of
academic journals may require a non-negligible amount of time.31
These delays lead to sequential search at the second stage. Suppose that, say, only
A enters the first stage. Inventor B needs the knowledge input from A to enter the
second stage, and his decision is made with the information that Amay have already
started the race. Shadow effect ensues.32 On the other hand, when both inventors en-
ter the first stage, simultaneous discovery is precluded in Poisson race. Disclosure by
30Bag and Dasgupta (1995) considers inventors’ disclosure decision in a two-stage Poisson race with
shadow effect, but does not include patent policy or reputation concerns. Note that the assumption of
common hazard rates is not crucial here. Shadow effect, or, more generally, information spill-over exists as
long as the two inventors’ hazard rates are correlated.
31In the case of online publishing, e.g., working papers, the delay may refer to the (random) amount of
time from the point the work is uploaded to the point it is searched and read by other researches.
32If A is allowed to delay her second-stage decision, it only complicates the Bayesian updating formula,
but does not change the qualitative result.
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one inventor also reveals to the other some information about the sequence of actions,
i.e., who had moved to the second stage. If an inventor adopts only pure strategy,
namely, the time from discovery of basic invention to submission for publication is
deterministic, then the opponent, when learning the basic invention from the publi-
cation, can perfectly figure out how much time has lapsed since the first inventor’s
second-stage decision. Through Bayesian updating again comes shadow effect.
The rest of the section uses a simple case to show how reputation concerns and
patent reward, respectively, induces the equilibrium behavior of immediate submis-
sion. Assume that the actions of submitting for publication and incurring cost to enter
the race are not observable to one’s opponent. Only the first submission is published
and only the first submitter receives the (patent or reputation) reward.33 The win-
ner of the disclosure game does not know whether there is a second submission, i.e.,
whether there is independent (but later) discovery of the basic invention. Either the
second submitter (if any) withdraws the patent application after knowing the same
invention has been patented, or the journal editor rejects identical result that has al-
ready been published. To simplify the analysis, consider fixed capacity at the sec-
ond stage, i.e., both inventors have a two-point cost distribution at the second stage,
c2i ∈ {0,pi + ε}, where ε > 0 and Pr(c2i = 0) = si, i ∈ {A, B}. An inventor enters the
second stage if and only if the cost is zero.
Assume that inventor B adopts the strategy of immediate submission after discov-
ering the basic invention. I derive the conditions under which A will not postpone
submission when B is not in the first-stage race. Competition for the first-stage prize
reduces the incentive to postpone submission. The same conditions therefore ensure
immediate submission when B also enters the first stage. The proof of Proposition 8
confirms this point.
First, consider a reputation reward R > 0 to the first inventor that publishes the
basic invention on a journal.34 Let △R > 0 be the delay in the academic publication.
Suppose that inventor A discovers the basic invention at time t and B does not enter
the first stage. If inventor A submits at time t+ d, with d ≥ 0, then inventor B enters
the second stage at time t+ d+△R with probability sB. If inventor A decides to stay
off the second stage, her expected payoff is R · e−r(d+△R) at the value of time-t; she has
no incentive to hold off. If inventor A enters the second stage, her expected payoff (at
33The first-to-file system is almost universally adopted, and the U.S. will join the ranks in 2013.
34See Merton (1973) for a discussion of priority as rewards in doing science.
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the time-t value) is
Re−r(d+△R) +
∫ d+△R
0
λαpie−(λ+r)tdt+ sB
∫
∞
d+△R
λαpie−(2λ+r)tdt
+ (1− sB)
∫
∞
d+△R
λαpie−(λ+r)tdt
=R · e−r(d+△R) + λv {η1(0) + sB[η2(d+△R)− η1(d+△R)]} ,
(45)
where v ≡ αpi, η1(T) =
∫
∞
T e
−(λ+r)tdt, and η2(T) =
∫
∞
T e
−(2λ+r)tdt. A marginal in-
crease in d changes the payoff by
−e−r(d+△R)
[
rR+ sBλv
(
e−2λ(d+△R) − e−λ(d+△R)
)]
, (46)
which is strictly negative for all d ≥ 0 if rR > sBλve−λ△R .
Next, let’s set R = 0 and consider how patent policy θ > 0 induces immediate
submission. Let △θ > 0 be the delay in patent application. When B does not enter
the first stage, inventor A’s payoff from entering the second stage (at time t) and filing
patent protection at time t+ d is
λv {η1(0) + sB[(1+ θ)η2(d+△θ)− η1(d+△θ)]} . (47)
The first-order condition to determine the optimal d has the same sign as
−(1+ θ)e−(2λ+r)(d+△θ) + e−(λ+r)(d+△θ), (48)
and the second-order condition has the same sign as
(2λ + r)(1+ θ)e−(2λ+r)(d+△θ) − (λ + r)e−(λ+r)(d+△θ). (49)
If the first-order condition becomes zero, by λ > 0 the second-order condition must
be strictly positive. The optimal d must be a corner solution, namely, either zero or
infinity. For d = 0 to be the (unique) solution, we must have (1+ θ)η2(△θ) > η1(△θ),
or, equivalently,
(1+ θ)
λ + r
2λ + r
> e(λ+r)△θ , (50)
which requires a sufficiently large θ, and a sufficiently small △θ . This condition also
ensures that inventor A will indeed enter the second race. Her expected payoff from
staying off the race and collecting licensing payment from inventor B is λvsBθη1(△θ),
strictly smaller than the payoff from participating.
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Proposition 8. When rR > siλve
−λ△R , i ∈ {A, B}, the reputation reward R induces imme-
diate submission for publication.
When condition (50) holds, the patent reward θ induces immediate submission.
Proof. Suppose that A discovers the basic invention at time t, and there is no publi-
cation yet. When B also participates in the first stage, immediate submission by A
does not guarantee her the reward. Delay in publication creates a window [t−△i, t),
j ∈ {R, θ}, during which B’s submission won’t be observed at time t. But if A further
postpones and submits at time t+ d, she will lose when B submits during [t, t + d).
Postponing delivers no benefit to an inventor that stays off the second stage. Suppose
that A enters the second stage. Since a follower enters when the cost is zero, we can
ignore the event where B’s discovery time lies between t−△j and t, i ∈ {R, θ}.35 Let
f (τ) and F(τ) be the pdf and CDF of inventor B’s first-stage arrival time τ. By the
memoryless property, there are the same as conditional distributions that B has not
discovered the basic invention at time t.
In the case of reputation reward, inventor A’s payoff of submitting at time t+ d is
λv
∫ t+d
t
[η1(0) + sB(η2(τ− t)− η1(τ − t))] f dτ
+
∫ t+d+△R
t+d
{
Re−r(d+△R) + λv[η1(0) + sB(η2(τ− t)− η1(τ − t))]
}
f dτ
+
∫
∞
t+d+△R
{
Re−r(d+△R) + λv[η1(0) + sB(η2(d+△R)− η1(d+△R))]
}
f dτ.
(51)
The first-order condition to determine the optimal d is
− f (d+△R)Re−r(d+△R) − [F(t+ d+△R)− F(t+ d)]rRe−r(d+△R)
− [1− F(t+ d+△R)]e−r(d+△R)
{
rR+ sBλv
[
e−2λ(d+△R) − e−λ(d+△R)
]}
.
(52)
The condition rR > sBλve
−λ△R also guarantees that A will not postpone.
In the case of patent reward, inventor A’s payoff is λv times
∫ t+d
t
(1− θ) {η1(0) + sB[η2(τ − t)− η1(τ − t)]} f dτ
+
∫ t+d+△θ
t+d
{η1(0) + sB[(1+ θ)η2(τ − t)− η1(τ − t)]} f dτ
+
∫
∞
t+d+△θ
{η1(0) + sB[(1+ θ)η2(d+△θ)− η1(d+△θ)]} f dτ.
(53)
35With more general cost distribution, shadow effect will affect inventor A’s entry decision for this range,
namely, A has to consider the event where she becomes the follower.
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The first-order condition contains two parts:
− θ f (t+ d) {η1(0) + sB[2η2(d)− η1(d)]}
− [1− F(t+ d+△θ)]sB[(1+ θ)e−(2λ+r)(d+△θ) − e−(λ+r)(d+△θ)].
(54)
The second part reflects the same concern as in the case where inventor B learns from
A’s disclosure, but now it only occurs with a probably, when B’s first-stage arrival
time is later than t+ d+△θ . The first part reflects the effect of losing the patent rights
to B, which is always negative for η1(d) ≤ η1(0) for all d ≥ 0. Again, competition
provides stronger incentive of earlier disclosure. Q.E.D.
Notice the opposite requirements on△R and△θ to induce immediate submission.
The reputation reward aims to compensate for A’s loss of giving away the basic in-
vention and a lower winning probability at the second stage due to B’s participation.
A longer delay in publication (higher △R) partially offsets the damage of disclosure,
and makes the condition more likely to hold. By contrast, the patent reward mitigates
A’s loss by transferring part of B’s return to A. Inventor A’s decision is either to hold
off submission indefinitely (in order to keep the monopoly status at the second stage),
or to facilitate entry of B and extract licensing payment. A lower △θ induces earlier
entry and makes the stake in Bmore valuable, and thus reduces the amount of patent
reward necessary for immediate submission. 
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